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Stable Coordination Beyond Institutional Boundaries: Integrating Network and Institutionalist Analytical Approaches to European Energy Market Coordination

European Union
Public Administration
Power
Energy
Timo Alexander Richter
Technische Universität Darmstadt
Timo Alexander Richter
Technische Universität Darmstadt

Abstract

Harmonizing the European energy market in line with the principles of energy security and efficiency is a challenging task that demands political and technical coordination. Civil servants of ministries and national regulatory authorities work hand-in-hand with employees of transmission system operators to overcome complexity and solve cross-border issues. The variety of institutionalized intergovernmental formats as well as fragmented responsibilities produce a high potential for territorial and political conflicts. As a result, the multilevel character is particularly pronounced in the policy field of energy. Consequently, this paper addresses the complex nature of coordination by evaluating under what conditions coordination appears as effective. Utilizing interview and survey data, my findings show that coordination between member states is generally perceived as highly effective. Results are puzzling since established interpretations of coordination in such an environment would rather assume friction in and difficulties of cooperation. To better comprehend coordination neo-institutionalist assumptions are applied side by side with network-theoretical assumptions. A network-based view helps to not only understand the relational level of coordination but can also be utilized as a tool for horizontal and vertical multilevel analysis. Additionally, I integrated neo-institutionalist assumptions, due to the high degree of institutionalization of coordination in the energy market. The combination of both theories provides a more appropriate approach by extending the set of institutional variables with relational ones. Their basic theoretical assumptions are compatible and complement each other. The interviews conducted indicate that trust relationships, group dynamics, informal norms and institutional design contribute to a stable coordination relationship. Power (centrality) and resources can link to effective coordination. Effects cannot be reduced to their presence (or absence) and are more distinctively nuanced. The results underpin the importance of analytically connecting and comparing different formats of energy coordination, as well as their institutional effect on perceived coordination performance.