Do Lobby Groups Set the Governmental Agenda? An Examination in Four Countries

Interest group lobbying is commonly cited as an important explanation for why governments attend to some issues and not others. There are, however, two competing views on the nature and target of the issues put forward: first, in a ‘transmission-belt’ perspective, interest groups are expected to signal public concerns and, sometimes together with party political friends, voice these in the policy process. They therewith lead cabinet ministers to prioritize these concerns over other policy topics. Second, in a ‘strategic’ perspective, interest groups strategically highlight issues on which they anticipate to successfully and silently raise its priority among bureaucrats. This leads interest groups, and especially business lobbyists compared to other interest representatives, to focus on particular bureaucratically relevant, policy niches about which the broader public is largely unaware. In this paper we examine the empirical plausibility of these two arguments by comparing the agenda of lobbyists with the agenda of the legislature (laws adopted) and the executive (speeches) in the United States, the Netherlands, Germany and the United Kingdom. We explain why government attends to some issues and deprioritizes others. Interest groups seem to be especially concerned about issues to which the government executives pay relatively little attention. This supports the ‘strategic’ perspective and raises a number of normative questions regarding the potential influence of lobbyists.