The general principles that put the ERC in place are not original: An intermediary organization, led by a group of eminent researchers who establish the rules of decision-making on basic funding based on excellence only – this sort of instrument exists at least since the implementation of the National Science Foundation in the US. However, for the European Union, its implementation meant a radical step, and forced the European Commission to unaccustomed concessions in terms of its own rules. The crucial question is, whether the operation was successful: How much autonomy did the ERC gain from its parental organization?
The proposed paper proceeds as follows: First, to highlight the newness of this institution within the European polity, I scrutinize the legal basis of the ERC. Dietmar Braun revealed that intermediary organizations provide space to negotiate interests between the two main groups of agents involved, policy-makers and scientists. Operationalizing this theory, I define indicators, similar to studies on the autonomy or distinctive types of institutions (such as universities). This opens the way for an empirical analysis, based on material obtained from the ERC Scientific Council, such as minutes and position papers, as well as on expert interviews. The goal is to “measure” the level of autonomy of the ERC, both in regards to its governance structure and to selected science policy issues.
When it comes to European integration at large, it is regularly criticized that “Eurocrats in Brussels” are self-obsessed, and European added value is put in doubt. Taking the ERC’s reputation in the scientific community, on the other hand, the result of my analysis may provide an answer to the looming question whether the European Union is able to innovate, and to unfold a greater variety of institutions, and probably better suited to fulfill their goals.
