This paper investigates the enforcement practices of financial regulation by independent regulatory agencies and how their decisions are challenged in court. By means of a quantitative approach, the paper explores empirically the frequency and determinants of appeals against financial supervisors in Western Europe (i.e., Swiss FINMA, German BAFIN, French AMF and ACPR). More concretely, the paper addresses the following questions: How does the probability of litigation varies with industry sectors (e.g., banks, insurance, other financial services), topics (e.g., anti-money laundering, prudential rules, market manipulation), measures (e.g. industry bans, compliance programs) and target groups (e.g., individual vs. firms, authorized vs unauthorized entities)? Under what conditions appeals against financial regulators are likely to succeed in Court? Rather than looking at the specificities of individual cases, the paper seeks to contribute to the understanding of the “big picture” in relation to enforcement policy in the area of financial supervision.
