In my paper I will examine causes and effects of decisions made by subnational courts of last resort on the legislative branch of government in the German Länder and the American States. I will identify the causes of judicial activsm in Berlin and in the Court of Appeals of New York. In consequence, the questions addressed in this project will be twofold. First, I will explore whether and to what extent, decisions of a subnational constitutional court in Germany and a state supreme court in the USA, encroach on the competencies of a subnatinal parliament or a state legislature. The effects of court rulings or decisions will be measured with a “strength index" that captures the possible impact of decisions made by subnational constitutional court. Second, I am assuming that the degree of judicial activism depends on institutional and attitudinal factors that are determined by the competencies and the composition of the respective constitutional court. Thus, I hypothesize that there is a causal link between the mandate a constitutional court has to conform with and attitudinal factors of judicial behavior on the one hand, and the degree of judicial activism on the other.
