Individual transferable quota (ITQ) schemes are market-based instruments that have become increasingly popular in fisheries management: more than 150 such schemes have been implemented worldwide. In ITQ schemes, a total catch limit is set for a fish stock and allocated to participants as quota shares, who can then trade these quota shares amongst each other.
ITQ schemes are often promoted as more flexible, cost-efficient, and effective at addressing overfishing than conventional, (command-and-control) fisheries management instruments. However, a frequent point of contestation is how fishing quota is distributed in an ITQ scheme: questions of justice arise with respect to who is eligible to receive fishing quota, and how much. ITQ schemes reflect a wide diversity of distribution rules (e.g. equal shares for all participants or auctioning of shares to the highest bidder). The aim of this paper is to explain why different distribution rules are adopted in different ITQ schemes.
Drawing on the literature on distributive justice, three categories of explanatory factors are identified. Firstly, the structural characteristics of the resource (e.g. type of resource, abundance of the resource, number of recipients) may be important for the choice of distribution rules. Secondly, the prevailing norms and values may affect what distribution rules are (not) considered fair. Thirdly, involvement of different actors during the design of distribution rules may be important, as the interests of different participants in a fishery (e.g. owners of large or small fishing boats, indigenous communities, recreational fishers) differ significantly. A database of over 150 fisheries ITQ schemes operating at different scales is used to assess the relative importance of these explanatory factors. This analysis of distribution rules in ITQs illuminates how fisheries governance is not only a question of effectively protecting a resource, but also raises questions of justice and fairness.
