Perceptual Accuracy of Elected Political Representatives

Policy congruence—the fact that policies match public preferences—is one of the cornerstones of democratic quality. It can essentially be produced in two ways: (1) voters elect the ‘right’ representatives (representatives holding preference that are similar to their own) and these then act following their own preferences; (2) elected representatives forming themselves a perception of the public’s preferences and then acting on those perceptions (Miller and Stokes 1963). This paper analyzes the latter mechanism. It examines individual politicians’ perceptions of public opinion with regard to policies and, more concretely, it focuses on the accuracy of these perceptions. We know little about this crucial linking mechanism of representation. The little we know is based on older data, it draws on U.S. evidence only, and, most importantly, it is descriptive in nature. Work offering a theoretical and empirical explanation of the differences of perceptual accuracy among elites is as good as absent. Therefore, this paper addresses two research questions: (1) How accurate are politicians’ assessments of public opinion? (2) How can differences in perceptual accuracy across elected representatives, across parties, across policy issues, and across political systems be explained. To answer these questions, we draw on evidence collected among elected representatives and the general population from four different political systems: Belgium (both the Flemish and the Francophone part; N=360), the Netherlands, and Switzerland.