During the euro area crisis, the role of the European Central Bank (ECB) as a political actor raised
concerns about its independence, accountability and legitimacy. Against this background, this
paper investigates whether the ECB reacted to these accountability concerns during and following
the sovereign debt crisis. We revisit the independence-accountability nexus, adding three
qualifications to the conventional wisdom that independence and accountability do not go
together. First, we argue that a fiduciary relation characterized by a high level of independence
with weakly developed accountability components represents a significant challenge for the
ECB’s role as a political actor. Second, when several of the accountability dimensions are weakly
developed, the formal bases of ECB authority are more likely to be questioned. Third, when
supranational institutions isolate themselves and resist attempts to render them accountable to the
outside world, they suffer from a multiple accountability disorder that is more likely to undermine
their authority in the long term. The findings contribute to the literature on accountability and the
causes and consequences of delegating power to supranational organizations.
