Interest groups are almost exclusively being studied as political agents. Although their political function is of paramount importance, lobbying is often only one part of their group activities. This is also true for many business interest organisations, which offer a (wide) repertoire of services. But their service functions are rarely taken into the equation in current research, although their existence is well acknowledged (e.g. Olson 1965: 145).
Taking stock of both their lobbying and service functions is essential when studying business interest groups as organisations. We first have to locate an organisation in the continuum between pure service provision and lobbying to properly assess its functions and position within the political and economic systems. Based on this knowledge one is then able to study and compare how organisational elites, members, and organisational environments shape specific organisational strategies.
I use multiple data, including an online survey, interviews with heads of organisations and documents on 30 German sub-sector business interest organisations, which have individual firms as members. The chosen organisations represent the chemical, pharmaceutical, food, and the mechanical engineering industry. In the paper, I study organisational strategies for furthering political and economic member interests related to the European Union and related to their members' international activities. Using organisation, institutional and principal agent theory, the aim is to a) explain when and why business interest organisations provide or develop particular functions and b) to explain when and why they choose to act autonomously or rather join (or rely on) other organisations. Apart from better understanding organisational strategies, the results can help to distinguish between different types of business interest organisations.
