This study examines when parties decide to frame issues in the same terms (convergence), or when they increase their framing distance to other parties (divergence). There already exists a rich body of literature on issue convergence, studying when parties decide to address the same issues, or adopt similar positions on these issues. Yet this contribution explores ‘framing convergence’, i.e. the conditions under which parties decide to frame issues in similar fashion. The main argument is that framing convergence is primarily driven by coalition considerations. Parties within multiparty systems compete in the wake of future coalition bargaining, and as such, mainstream opposition parties, which have previously been part of governing coalitions, are unlikely to adopt large framing distances to other parties since this would jeopardize their coalition appeal. In contrast, challenger parties, i.e. parties that have never governed, have every reason to divergence because the probability that they will have to cooperate with other parties is rather low. Yet challenger parties are expected to reduce their framing distance in response to a more favorable standing in election polls. Electoral success acts as a trigger for these parties to reconsider their goals and become more office-seeking. This implies that they have to move in the direction of the dominant discourse to be considered realistic candidates for coalition governance. Finally, the impact of political system characteristics such as the level of proportionality and effective number of parties on these linkages is examined. The theoretical propositions are tested on the issue of European integration, utilizing pooled time-series regressions on party manifestos issued by 21 parties between 1987 and 2006 in three political systems (Germany, Netherlands, and UK) .
