Turning the Clock: The Manipulation of Legislative Time as a Strategy in Bicameral Bargaining

To what extent can the duration of a bill’s passage be strategically manipulated in order to avoid concessions to the opposition in a second chamber? Second chambers are traditionally seen as venues where opposition parties can veto government bills or force a government into concessions using veto threats (Fortunato et al. 2013; König/Bräuninger 1997, 2005; Manow/Burkhart 2007; Krehbiel 1996). First chambers are extensively studied with regard to the ability of the governing majority to exercise agenda-control (Döring/Hönnige 2006; Huber 1996; Döring 1995). We argue that it is necessary to combine both perspectives to understand the opposition’s influence and limitations in legislative bargaining. In particular, we claim that manipulating legislative time is an essential strategy in bicameral bargaining. We hypothesize that a government acts in an anticipative manner, foreseeing the future composition of the second chamber. Accordingly, if a government fears to lose control over the second chamber in the near future it strategically speeds up parliamentary processes. On the contrary, if a government assumes to gain control it delays legislative processes. The government does so in order to save proposals from a potential veto by the opposition and to prevent policy concessions. In order to test our argument we compile a novel dataset of 1,645 bills proposed in Germany. Germany’s symmetric and asymmetric bicameralism provides a hard test of our argument. Results from survival analysis confirm our expectations on the strategic use of time by the government. This has major implications for the understanding of political bargaining in bicameral systems. The strategic use of time allows a government to enforce its agenda without relying on institutionalized, visible features to manage legislative conflict with the opposition. With regard to opposition politics, the findings imply that symmetric second chambers are less influential than traditionally assumed.