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ECPR

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Organized Interaction Between Regulators and Stakeholders

European Union
Interest Groups
Public Administration
Torbjørg Jevnaker
CICERO Center for International Climate Research
Torbjørg Jevnaker
CICERO Center for International Climate Research

Abstract

Relations between interest groups and regulators are commonly seen as an exchange of access for information and legitimacy (Bouwen 2002). However, this transaction is not necessarily on equal terms: the regulator may set the rules of the game (Jarman 2011). Scholars have examined what consultation instruments are found in the toolbox of a regulator (Arras & Braun 2017, Perez-Duran 2017), and which tools are being applied (Wood 2017) and under which conditions (Van Ballaert 2017). However, we know less about how the toolbox was filled up in the first place: What were the causes behind the organization of consultation processes, and why did reorganization occur over time? Such organization matters because scholars have found a relationship between the type of consultation and the degree of participation bias among interest groups (Quittkat & Kotzian 2011, Rasmussen & Gross 2015). More broadly, the organization of government affects the chances of an interest group successfully influencing policy (Klüver et al 2015). The organization of regulator-stakeholder interaction (e.g. venues or tools organized by regulators to consult with and receive input from stakeholders) are visible indicators of how a regulator would like to prioritize the dialogue with external organizations. A regulator might seek to optimize how it collects needed information, and organize its interaction with stakeholders based on this objective in mind. However, formal design may also reflect how the regulator seeks to portray this interaction, and may deviate from actual interaction patterns. Regulators engage in conscious self-representation vis-à-vis its external audiences to maintain a good reputation (Carpenter 2010). Thus, examining what happens to the information received via consultations is important. This paper traces an EU agency’s consultation processes over time, seeking to identify whether the organization (and self-presentation) of interaction with stakeholders is driven by functional needs or reputation management. Is the agency responding selectively to its audiences by making symbolic changes to a highly visible structure like the consultation process design? Open consultations and public meetings could be used as a catch-all tactic for gaining legitimacy by claiming openness and transparency, while closed consultations and stakeholder bodies are more exclusive tools that could be used to respond to select audiences. While the paper will examine the organization of how input is being collected and how this has evolved over time, it will also be important to check what happens to the information thus received – in order to identify the impact of consultations. What does the agency do with the input it receive through consultations? The paper will examine whether there are routines or established practices for handling and processing the information received by the agency via stakeholder consultations.