Solidarity in the EU - Between Citizens, Nations and Union of States

There is a widespread perception that solidarity, as a non-enforceable principle, however based on strong moral values, requires some common ground or identity in order to exist (see e.g. Stjernø, 2009). In this paper I want to dive deeper into the question of solidary agency, arguing that it is in fact the commitment to a certain political idea that constitutes a solidary group, not (merely) certain characteristics the group shares as such. A conceptual distinction of solidarity from concepts such as love or loyalty (see Arendt, 1965, Kolers, 2016) helps clarifying the grounds for solidary agency. Applied to the case of the European Union, I will attempt to argue for a European solidary group based on the commitment to some European political project – through a type of solidarity that Kolers would argue requires the readiness to potentially act in deference against one’s own convictions as long as action serves the goal of the group (which ones sides with). This solidarity I take to demand more from its agents than institutionalised forms of redistribution that are legally enforceable because it requires the active commitment to choose sides for a certain political reason and then defer one’s own beliefs to the group (Kolers, 2016). I will close my presentation by sketching out potential implications of this account of solidarity on the EU specifically as a union of states (Forsyth, 1981). The main difficulty here I take to be to gain awareness for the need for solidarity away from the technocratic integration process (Habermas) that underlies the EU as we know it today.