Exploring the properties of selection procedures is a central theme in public choice theory. This study tests the effect selecting a redistributive tax rate by lot compared to majority voting and unanimous consent. To the causal effect of the selection procedure on the acceptance of redistributive taxation, we designed a two-stage real-effort laboratory experiment. In the first stage, subjects earn a personal endowment in a real-effort task and select a tax rate by lot, majority voting or unanimous consent. In the second stage, subjects repeat the real-effort task given the tax rate implemented in the first stage. Subjects’ acceptance is measured in terms of subjective satisfaction with the collective decision and in behavioral terms as effort reduction between the first and second stage of the real-effort task. Experimental results can be summarized in two points: First, the section procedure has no substantive effect on subjects’ real-effort. Second, subjective acceptance of the implemented tax rate is the highest under unanimous consent, while majority voting and allotment yield identical levels of subjective acceptance of the implemented tax rate.
