Independent and non-partisan expert bodies that monitor budgetary policies (fiscal “watchdogs”) hold a key role in supervising fiscal policymaking. However, recent scholarship especially on the mandate and functions of fiscal councils neglects the selection process of experts. In fact, in a plurality of cases appointment rights lie with the parliament or the executive, and evidence is mounting that the selection of members is subject to political biases. This paper examines expert appointments in cases in which the finance minister has a de facto right in the selection of members, particularly in fiscal councils in Belgium, Ireland, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. A comparison between characteristics of the portfolio holder and appointed experts allows to discover selection patterns with regard to (i) academic merits, (ii) expertise and issue salience, and (iii) political orientation. It is hypothesised that finance ministers with an academic degree in economics are more likely to discount political orientation in the selection of council members.
