Since the end of the Cold War, following the global proliferation of interstate activities at the regional level, also Eurasia has experienced a proliferation of regional organizations (RO). All in all, more than 20 ROs emerged since 1991. Among numerous shallow ROs, which were created in the 90ies and early 2000s, especially the recently founded Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) sticks out as the first comprehensive deep integration agreement in the region. It does not only comprise wide-reaching and detailed rules and a very sophisticated institutional structure, but also displays a better implementation record than other Eurasian organizations. Even more important, for the first time Russia foregoes its veto. The paper argues that the EAEU is a tool to ensure survival of the Russian regime, which is driven by the concern to balance against threatening external actors and to prevent neighbor states from seeking alliances with these external actors. Even though I propose to understand the EAEU as a means of regime survival, as opposed to most accounts in the field of authoritarian politics, I do not argue that the organization’s main purpose is to ensure the survival of a certain regime type, namely autocracy, but simply to ensure the survival of the incumbent regime. Assuming that autocratic regimes are rational actors that are first and foremost interested in their survival, it is argued that deep integration agreements are possible among autocratic states if survival concerns in the face of (perceived) threats make them necessary, benefits exceed costs and negotiating states have enough bargaining power vis-à-vis the strongest actor to enforce concessions."
