I study the strategic use of referenda on integration by politicians and whether referenda bring policies and levels of integration closer to voter preferences. I present spatial models of referenda with incomplete information. Some scholars have studied the use of referenda to strengthen countries’ bargaining positions in international politics in general and EU politics in particular. Others have analyzed whether referenda bring policies closer to voters. I combine these two literatures. In my model politicians have private information on the consequences of integration. Voters get signals prior to the referendum. Moreover, I study how referenda can be used strategically by politicians to achieve outcomes that are more advantageous to the voters they represent. Voters have private information on their own preferences, however. To the extent that they can share this information with their political representatives this may further strengthen the bargaining position vis-à-vis other member states’ politicians. However, if they cannot share this information, it may lead to miscalculations by political representatives in decisions to call for referenda and to outcomes that are worse for all member states.
