Following the Lisbon treaty’s reforms, article 50 of the Treaty on European Union gives the European Parliament (EP) a relevant role in the process for a Member State to withdraw from the European Union. More precisely, the EP must give its consent on the terms of the withdrawal agreement. To what extent is the EP able to use its power in the Brexit negotiations? In what ways? It has been argued that the Parliament has been very instrumental in using its institutional levers and democratic credentials or in using incomplete contracts to press for a stronger voice in EU policy-making. Conversely, there are reasons to be sceptical of the EP’s influence in the Brexit negotiations. These relate to the responsible behaviour the EP has developed in law-making, especially when the stakes for the member states are high; to its declining popular support and the emergence of the highly legitimate European Council in a more politicised Union; to the configuration of the various actors’ preferences in the Brexit negotiations. The first part of the paper will develop an analytical grid that thoroughly identifies the institutional and political mechanisms that can empower or, vice versa, curb the EP’s powers in the Brexit negotiations. The paper will then provide a first assessment of the EP’s actual influence in the negotiations up to date.
