In times of crisis, the executives have taken a predominant position in EU decision-making processes. The European Council de facto evolved to a crisis manager in the Euro crisis and beyond. This executive dominance has been argued to limit the democratic control of EU affairs in national parliaments. This paper investigates parliamentary scrutiny in form of plenary debates on European Council meetings to test this assumption. The focus is on opposition parties whose competitive position towards the government should incentivize to publicly voice critique of EU and domestic governance. Which factors explain a competitive strategy of opposition party groups on matters of EU decision-making? The paper investigates two case studies chosen according to the logic of the most-similar system design: Austria and Germany. The institutional structures coincide on all factors relevant for the role of opposition, whereas the parties groups differ significantly in their positions and type. The study builds on a rational choice institutionalist approach and derives its assumptions from research on opposition parties. It is guided by two hypotheses, which assume that the party type (anti-establishment or regular) and the ideological distance between governing and opposition parties motivate for a more competitive approach in EU scrutiny activities. Two dimensions of conflict are expected to matter for the framing of EU affairs: a value dimension and a socio-economic one. The empirical analysis shows that anti-establishment parties emphasize frames of national interests and national sovereignty, which are exploitable for the critique of the government members. The framing of the Euro crisis else did not alter the lines of political conflict within each chamber, but corresponds to the dominant political cleavages.
