On Leadership and Control in EU Foreign and Security Policy. The Post-Lisbon Treaty High Representative and the Ukrainian Crisis

When the Lisbon Treaty came into force in 2009, it was generally assumed that its innovations would have ensured the effectiveness and legitimacy of EU foreign policy. Nonetheless, as a series of political and military conflicts arisen at the EU borders is generating pressure to formulate more efficient foreign and security policies, the EU seems to be less and less able to respond to a variety of external challenges. Consequently, it is a widespread opinion that the results of the post-Lisbon EU foreign and security policy have been poor so far. Adopting a broad conceptualization of EU foreign and security policy, the paper will assess the tensions between effective and legitimate leadership in the events that lead to the Ukrainian crisis and in EU response to its unfolding. This would be done examining the role of the High Representative (HR) as chair of the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) and in her/his capacity as Vice President (VP) of the European Commission. While the absence of the first post-Lisbon HR’s leadership in coordinating the EU foreign policy before the 2013 Vilnius Summit can be partially ascribed to her weak agency, diverging preferences among member states on the strategies to adopt towards Ukraine after the Maidan protests and the ensuing annexation of Crimea, made it difficult – if not impossible – for the HR to lead EU response to the Ukrainian crisis. Thus, notwithstanding the LT’s innovations in foreign and security policy, national governments reunited in the European Council exerted all their control on the HR, on the Foreign Affairs Council and on the Commission.