Electoral Incentives and Legislator - Constituency Linkages in Supra-National Contexts

Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) use frequently parliamentary questions to engage in oversight of their national executives: MEPs from national opposition parties ask parliamentary questions to obtain information on the national government's actions (Proksch and Slapin 2011), while MEPs from mainstream national opposition parties use questions as a form of fire alarm oversight when the issue at stake concerns their Member State (Jensen et al. 2013). I argue that MEPs' usage of parliamentary questions should also be conceived as a linkage mechanisms to their constituents, comprising a broader variety of national issues and going beyond their party's government - opposition status. The strength of this linkage is shaped by the institutional and personal circumstances of their election: ballot structure and electoral marginality influence the MEPs' likelihood of asking questions related to their state or regional constituency. The electoral system incentives for legislative effort in the European Parliament are still disputed. A recent study (Hoyland et al. 2017) illustrated that MEPs elected from candidate-centered systems participate less in parliamentary activities than their colleagues elected from party-centered systems. Conversely, MEPs elected under a candidate-centered system are more likely to ask written questions (Sozzi 2016). The study draws on two random samples of parliamentary questions asked in the 6th and 7th term of the European Parliament. The negative binomial regression models also control for various factors that influence legislative activism in the EP: the MEP's previous career and her roles in the current term, affiliation to governing party. The preliminary findings show that the only substantial divide related to the electoral system is that between MEPs elected under Single Transferable Vote (STV) and those elected under closed list PR, with the former being more active in submitting questions about their Member States. Higher electoral marginality increases the likelihood of asking constituency questions.