Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (REDD) is supposed to be implemented through multilateral funding mechanisms. Currently, three such main multilateral initiatives exist (i.e. FIP, FCPF, UN-REDD), constituting the core of a global REDD governance architecture. Before this background the objective of this article is to compare the main multilateral REDD initiatives based on their legal, political and economic configurations: (i) the programmes’ and their main actors’ status in and compatibility with existing international law, (ii) the main actors’ (i.e. donors and recipients) formal ability to influence either of the programmes based on voting right structures, and (iii) the financial flows from donor to recipient countries under the three main multilateral REDD-initiatives. This comparison will be conducted using content analysis of fundamental policy and legal documents of the three initiatives. Analyses are done in an inter-disciplinary manner building on international law as well as policy analysis and global governance backgrounds. The results show that the multilateral global governance architecture of REDD entails a considerable degree of institutional fragmentation. This is based on differences between the programmes regarding their and their members' status in international law, the members' ability to influence each programme, and the patterns of financial contributions to each of the funds. The paper discusses the degree to which these differences in the institutional design of the initiatives can be interpreted as conflictive or synergistic types of fragmentation. It concludes that these differences, while leading to institutional fragmentation of the REDD governance architecture, represent a case of political competition and evolution, until the most competitive initiative(s) will succeed.
