Aim of the proposed paper is to explain the reform of the prudential requirements for securitization in the EU as a pillar of the Capital Markets Union. The revision of the Basel framework for securitization has been a late major piece in the post-crisis overhaul of the international financial governance and coincided with the launch of the Juncker plan of a CMU to revitalize the securitization markets in the EU. According to the literature available, cross-border banks and investments firms are the true potential beneficiaries of the CMU. Yet, an in-depth analysis of the transnational financial industry lobbying and influence, in the light of the final agreement on the securitization reform package, is still missing. In this paper, I intend to fill the above gap in the story. I will rely on a Critical IPE approach by focusing on competing private/public coalitions at the EU level representing conflicting economic interests and political projects regarding the CMU plan and the securitization reform. As independent variables to explain the industry lobbying capability, I will focus on the scope and inclusiveness of the “light-touch” coalition, led by the transnational financial industry, in respect to a “pro-regulatory” one, by measuring them in terms of the different sectoral interests and Member States’ preferences coalesced. The cross-border players crucially built up a broad consensus on the need to revitalize capital markets in the EU, by creating a high-quality label for securitization, in order to differentiate channels of funding for the European non-financial companies. Yet, the consensus on tougher requirements for securitization within the Basel Committee, the European Commission and the European Parliament, together with the UK abandonment of the table of negotiations after the results of the Brexit referendum, empowered the ‘pro-regulatory’ coalition, so to harm the lobbying capabilities of the transnational financial industry coalition.
