One of the fast-emerging research agendas in international political economy is associated with the concept of financial nationalism with the post-2010 policy transformation of Hungary under prime minister Viktor Orbán treated as a classic case. These studies assume that electoral change is the primary causal source of policy switches. Nevertheless, policy change is often gradual, with sea-changes preceded by less visible transformations below the surface. In this paper I argue that the origins of financial nationalism go back before Orbán’s 2010 electoral victory. The 2006 budget cut-backs and the financial crisis of 2008 ushered in a new era in business-government relations in the financial sector, which paved the way for the even more pronounced policy switch after 2010. The paper supports this claim by an examination of the dynamics of the lobbying power of the Hungarian Banking Association (HBA). The computer-assisted analysis of HBA press releases shows that the general lobbying success and preference attainment of the organization on major policy issues decreased after 2010—nevertheless, seismic activity was already under way after 2006.
