Towards a Non-Populist Theory of Direct Democracy

It has become commonplace to say that democracy is in crisis. While this assertion is a matter of debate, it clearly concerns a particular (and today predominant) form of democracy – representative democracy. Hence a large scholarly debate has developed on how to reform democracy in order to promote citizen participation and to enhance the legitimacy of democratic institutions. In the field of political theory the dominant answer has been deliberative democracy. Surprisingly, few political theorists have explored the potential of bottom-up direct democracy (DD), that is, a frequent use of popular initiatives and facultative referendums. Indeed, as scholars have already noted, we lack a theory of DD. As Michael Saward (2000: 12) has observed, “the institutions of DD do not have tables at the democratic theory feast”. Why do theories of democracy focus so little on DD? A review of the literature shows a genuine concern that DD might give rise to populist demands (at the level of input), to populist decisions (at the level of output) and contribute to a rise in populist politicians, movements and parties. In this paper I will present a theory of DD that is sufficiently robust to resist the charge of populism. I shall show that, under certain conditions (both theoretical and empirical), far from being an easy tool in the hands of populist leaders, DD can actually structurally undermine populist rhetoric and support institutions of representative democracy. The bulk of the paper will consist in defining the theoretical and normative conditions under which a non-populist DD can be successful. In addition, I propose a deliberation-driven innovation of DD, inspired by randomly-selected deliberative citizens’ panels (“the Oregon model”) that take place before an actual popular vote and which recommendations are made available for voters. Saward, M. 2000. Direct and deliberative democracy.