A general point of agreement in contemporary Kantian theories of territorial rights seems to be the value of self-determination of states and groups. In this paper, I argue that the main reason for Kant’s protection of the “internal social contract” of polities against external coercion is not a concern for self-determination per se, but the requirement that actual consent to the expansion of the rule of law to the relation between states be possible. While individuals in a state of nature do not have to consent to the rule of law and can be coerced into a civil condition, consent plays a crucial role in the relation between states in international law. I argue that Kant’s discussion of Völkerrecht or international law operates on two levels: at the level of reason, involving strictly rational ideals and requirements, and at the non-ideal, “real world“ scenario, which is constrained by empirical factors such as the actual internal development of given polities, the mentality of the people and their willingness to implement what reason requires. Kant’s account of Völkerrecht takes this reality into account, and operates with the presupposition that states are externally independent from one another as moral persons. In conclusion, I defend a Kantian view of territorial rights as permissible and indeed required insofar as states must be able to consent to the international expansion of the rule of law.
