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Collaborative Federalism and the Construction of Economic Union - A Comparative Study of Intergovernmental Relations in Canada and the European Union

Comparative Politics
European Union
Federalism
Governance
Integration
Public Policy
Robert Csehi
Corvinus University of Budapest
Robert Csehi
Corvinus University of Budapest

Abstract

The creation of an economic union (from monetary and trade policy through fiscal matters to labor market considerations) increases the disconnection between the legal and political trends of integration. This leads to a paradox where constituent units recognize the need to further coordinate their own jurisdictions without formally transferring more responsibilities to the federal level. As the European Union attempts to accommodate this paradox it goes through a renaissance of intergovernmentalism despite its over fifty years if integration and federal institutionalization. Consequently, this paper asks how, and under which conditions do constituent units of federal political systems turn to intergovernmental policy coordination? To understand this return to intergovernmentalism, this study advances a constructivist approach to federal theory that attempts to finetune the idea of ‘collaborative federalism’ (Cameron and Simeron, 2002) by synthesizing it with the ‘deliberative turn’ (Neyer, 2006). Collaborative federalism provides the analytical framework focusing on intergovernmental relations while deliberation provides the necessary procedural considerations fit for the policy areas characterized by the paradox highlighted above. Based on a two-level analysis this study argues that the existence or lack of ‘deliberative capacities’ in the system (e.g. the existence of a ’common life world’, the uncertainty of interests and identities, the relative absence of power relations, etc.) is responsible for intergovernmental policy coordination. Focusing on the creation of economic union in Canada (through internal trade) and the EU (through economic governance) this paper shows that first, the lack of these capacities have created an incentive for further intergovernmental coordination while the effectiveness of this coordination depends on these same capacities of the newly created intergovernmental mechanisms (e.g. institutions, procedures and outputs). This paper attempts to verify the validity of the theoretical framework advanced based mainly on interviews conducted with government officials and public servants working in the related areas.