The Construction of What? From Weak to Strong Constructivism in the Study of Political Representation

Recent theorizing suggests that political representation is socially constructed: that claims to represent involve the construction – rather than merely the tracking and reflecting – of what is to be represented by way of the same claims. This has been offered as a liberating insight, supposedly moving the theory and practice of representation away from a narrow focus on the institutions of representative democracy, and away from a view of preferences, interests, and identities as exogenously given to representation. Without denying the merits of constructivist theories of representation, the paper argues that this kind of theorizing has so far failed to deliver on its promises. Much like the conventional theories of representation of which they are a critique, constructivist theories are hampered by their understanding of the dynamic between claims by would-be representatives and the uptake of those claims by the nominally represented. A root cause of the problem, I argue, is an underdeveloped and inconsistent conception of social construction in constructivist theories of representation. This conception is identified in the paper as weak constructivism, which I take to be indicative of an inadequate understanding of social meaning in political studies in general. In lieu of weak constructivism I propose a strong constructivism allowing for a more productive engagement with the dynamic between representative claims and their uptake. What is at stake here is our understanding of agency and judgment in political representation, and the normative standards by which we may consider representation democratically legitimate – after the constructivist turn.