How do salience and impatience affect member states’ bargaining strategies in legislative decision-making in the Council of the European Union? We theorise that low salience or high impatience facilitate bargaining agreements, explaining legislative outcomes under otherwise deadlocked preference constellations. We test how the two variables shape member states’ strategies, coalitions and success, and, more fundamentally, sustain the Council as a legislative institution. Drawing on comprehensive data and novel operationalisations of key variables at the member state, coalition and file level, we demonstrate the importance of distinguishing between salience and impatience in the EU’s legislative bargaining. Our findings also help to refine the causal link between policy conflict, salience, impatience and bargaining success; contribute to better explaining “implausible outcomes” in legislative decision-making; and speak to the likely consequences of politicising Council decision-making, in view of either increased salience or growing policy conflict.
