Evidence from media and academic research suggest that, during the first Zapatero government (2004-2008), the Oficina Económica del Presidente (hereafter, OEP) played an activist role, not only in the development of its legal functions (mainly, advising the president on economic matters, as well assisting him in the relations between the Government and other relevant actors), but also in the decision-making process related to economic policy. The same evidence also indicates that such empowerment of the OEP was made at the expense of the minister of Finance (Kölling, 2009). From our point of view, such phenomenon constituted another expression of the presidentialization of politics already observed for the Spanish case (Biezen and Hopkin, 2005). According to this, our hypothesis states that Zapatero empowered the OEP in order to strength his position within the political system; a strategy very similar to those pursued by leaders like Tony Blair or Michael Howard, who apparently gained predominance by reinforcing their respective prime ministerial staffs (Burch y Holliday, 2004; Tiernan, 2006). Given that the OEP was headed by individuals who had no political experience at the moment of their appointment (likewise assisted by technical experts of the same background); this paper intends to show why and how presidentialization fostered the rise of technocrats during the first Zapatero Government, but also the way in which the tandem formed by Zapatero and his “closest technocrats” affected the functioning of core executive.
