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The Right of Necessity and Migration

Human Rights
Political Theory
Social Justice
Global
Immigration
Ethics
Normative Theory
Alejandra Mancilla
Universitetet i Oslo
Alejandra Mancilla
Universitetet i Oslo

Abstract

Many contemporary cosmopolitan theories (especially justice cosmopolitanism) take basic human rights as a starting point wherefrom to ground the duties of the well-off towards the needy at the global level. Elsewhere, I have suggested that a point that has been mostly overlooked in the discussion is that taking basic human rights seriously—and the basic right to subsistence in particular—also implies acknowledging that people in need have a right of necessity to take, use and/or occupy the property of others in order to get out of their plight. In other words, it implies acknowledging that people in need, given a set of conditions, are morally permitted to do things that go against the standard laws in order to fulfill their basic rights. For example, squatting, occupying land and shoplifting. Bearing in mind that most of those who may exercise their a right are practically incapacitated from so doing (because the resources needed are unavailable or inaccessible), and bearing in mind that the repeated exercise of this right could have disturbing consequences for society as a whole, I have also suggested that accepting the existence of a right of necessity should not be seen as a recipe for fixing the problem of global poverty. Rather, it should be seen as an urgent enticement to redraw the normative landscape of cosmopolitan rights and duties. Regarding the former, the right of collective resistance against chronic deprivation, for example, could be grounded on the individual right of necessity of those claiming it. Regarding the latter, the final duty not to allow anyone to fall in a situation such that they may claim necessity while at the same time being practically incapacitated from so doing should be put center stage. In this paper, I explore the implications of this proposal for the phenomenon of illegal migration, and suggest that receiving countries might be much less entitled to control their borders than what has commonly been done, insofar as many of those seeking to enter should be morally permitted to do it. After developing this idea, I address some of the objections that may be raised against it; most prominently, the potential unfairness for neighboring and easily targetable countries that accepting such a prerogative could create.