In this paper, we discuss what implications Global Luck Egalitarianism (GLE) will have for the ethics of immigration, in particular for the question of whether states are justified in closing their borders to outsiders seeking entry. According to some writers, open borders is a natural implication of GLE, because a person’s country of origin will typically influence the quality of her live massively, even though she has no control over where she was born. If severe and pervasive inequalities are traceable to differences in birthplace, open borders seem to be a good idea. Others, however, are skeptical, both to the GLE as a normative ideal, and to the assumption that GLE will have liberal implications for border control. First, it has been argued that the GLE rests on assumptions that obtain in domestic contexts, but not on the global level. A second objection claims that GLE is implausible when applied to collective agents, such as states. Third, one could hold that the only implication GLE has for border control is that it should be exercised so as to realize GLE. Whether this means open or closed borders will simply follow from the specific circumstances that happen to obtain. Lastly, one could object that open borders would actually be detrimental to GLE, because the most resourceful individuals in disadvantaged societies would be the ones most likely to leave, thus rendering the less resourceful relatively, or even absolutely worse off. Contra these objections, we argue that GLE is indeed comprehensible as a global ideal, and that it might well have liberal implications for border control. However, whether or not borders should be open or (semi-) closed is (of course) not completely insensitive to specific circumstances.
