A Strategic-Interactional Approach to the Cessation of Violence: Why the IRA Ended its Campaign

Despite extensive research on negotiated peace settlements there is one important area in which we have developed relatively little knowledge: the question of how and why anti-state militants bring an end to their armed campaigns. Much of the existing research tends to emphasize the role of state action and strategy in forcing rebel groups into ending their campaigns and marginalizes the agency of those groups. This paper argues instead that the ending of armed campaigns is driven in large measure by the active pursuit of organizational goals by militant leaderships. The paper uses the case of the Northern Ireland peace process to explore the value of a strategic-interactionist approach (Jasper 2004; Duyvendak and Jasper 2015) in explaining the ending of armed campaigns. It examines the strategic interaction between the key parties to conflict, focusing primarily on strategic action by the British state and the Provisional IRA, which it identifies as the key parties to the negotiated ending of violence. Contrary to the existing literature, it argues that the decision of the IRA to end its campaign and enter negotiations on a compromise peace settlement was not primarily the product of state action but was in large measure driven by the active pursuit of organizational goals by the Republican leadership. The paper concludes by setting out an agenda for future research on the role of strategic decision-making by anti-state actors in the ending of armed campaigns and the negotiation of peace settlements.