The illegitimacy claims against international courts, tribunals and treaty bodies (ICs) are multifaceted. Some lament the legitimacy deficits of ICs concerning their lack of legality, other point to partial compliance by those states subject to the ICs; yet other illegitimacy worries are that the decisions of a IC are ineffectual even when complied with, or has untoward effects. Yet others critique such ICs for their questionable procedures or judgements, or they hold that its normative justifiability otherwise leaves something to be desired. ‘Legitimacy’ thus seems to be used in several different ways, several of which seem to affect the ‘normative pull’ of the judgments may by the international judiciary. Are the legal, sociological, causal and normative concepts of legitimacy related in helpful ways, if so how? And how are they related for the ICs in different sectors, ranging from human rights to investment? In particular, several critics suggest that normative concepts of legitimacy are irrelevant or worse: cloaking manipulation and domination.
Is there a common structure underlying discussions of the legitimacy of international courts and tribunals? Or are the various charges alleging illegitimacy merely using homonyms? If the various claims are interrelated, a theory should provide some frame to help us see how these factors sometimes relate. The presentation seeks to lay out some such connections from the vantage point of normative political theory; thereby also challenging claims that all discussions of legitimacy are mere manipulation by new means.
