When, if at all, should members get expelled from a federation? Federal arrangements have, especially in political theory, long been regarded as a guarantee both universal norms and particularist rights. But flexibility in membership has been considered only in two cases - voluntary accession and voluntary secession. The problem of expulsion has received much less systematic attention; an omission that is reinforced by the lack of historical precedent.
However, recent political developments especially in the European Union have raised the dilemma of how to treat a non-compliant member state in violation of previously agreed-upon rules and norms: What if temporary sanctions are unable to motivate a change in policy? Beyond the EU, regional organizations and international integration projects are facing the analogous problem of enforcing norms of democracy and the rule of law. Should the possibilty of expulsion thus be considered in some cases, as a last-resort option for safeguarding an international integration project?
The paper investigates the reasons behind and implications of this blind spot in political theory as well as constitutional practice. It argues that the omission of expulsion constitutes a problematic oversight, the roots of which lie in current methodological limitations - and that tit should be remedied through a more comprehensive theorization, which could offer guidance on the plausibility - or implausibility - of an expulsion clause as a constitutional last resort in specific federal constellations. Based on this consideration, the paper develops criteria for when membership flexibility, in the form of an expulsion, should be considered as an option of last resort for safeguarding an political project. A number of criteria for a more comprehensive theorization will be introduced that can help determine if specific federations, such as the European Union, might benefit from a carefully designed expulsion clause, and what normative conditions this design is subject to.
