Descriptive Representation and Compulsory Voting

It has been nearly two decades since scholars concerned to reverse the political exclusion of minorities argued that descriptive representation was the way forward (Philips 1995, Williams 1998, Mansbridge 1999, Young 2000). This was translated into calls for introducing quotas for parties, parliaments and governments, and a policy of favouring members of underrepresented groups in political and administrative appointments. Even if these inputs marked an important step towards reversing patterns of exclusion, much remains to be done in this direction. Importantly, the focus of political inclusion has been placed on representatives themselves, leaving the question of including the represented out of sight. What is the point in having minimum quotas in place, when the majority of members of underrepresented groups do not turn out to vote? How can a guaranteed number of seats for a group make up for the systematic abstention of hundreds of thousands voters from that group? Is having an African-American US President enough to compensate for the political inequalities experienced by blacks in the US? Clearly it is not; rather, it seems that the way ‘descriptive representation’ has been understood and practiced so far has merely created elites within marginalized communities, rather than strengthening their voice and substantive representation. In this article, we seek to explain what is missing from the conception of descriptive representation and elaborate on the missing part. We argue that descriptive representation involves two dimensions –representatives who resemble the represented and represented who choose look-alike representatives Of these, the latter dimension has been gravely overlooked in the representation literature. One reason for this neglect is, of course, that voters cannot be instructed to choose look-alike representatives. Once included in the process, they are free to choose anybody, including MPs who do not resemble them. This, however, does not subtract from the value of choosing independently for themselves. Ultimately, descriptive representation may be a method by which the represented choose representatives who think rather than look like themselves. And they are best suited to make such a choice, since they alone know better than anyone how they think. Voters can thus decide who describes their thoughts and judgments better than others. If our reading is correct, then descriptive representation presupposes representatives who think like their constituents just as much as it requires represented who choose their representatives themselves. This calls for inclusive universal representation, even if that means legally requiring people to vote. The last part of the article compares such a reading of descriptive representation with two uses: first, it is comparable with the idea of ‘mirror’ representation that was historically used by supporters of mandatory voting in Belgium. Second, it connects to the principle of ‘descriptive representation’ advanced by supporters of random selection. While we are sympathetic to the former use insofar as it focuses on the inclusion of voters, the latter misses this point as it conceptualizes descriptive representation as demographic likeness in the same manner as mainstream theories.