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Populism and Democracy in Turkey: From Kemalism to Political Islam

Democracy
Political Parties
Populism
Ibrahim Saylan
Dokuz Eylül University
Ibrahim Saylan
Dokuz Eylül University

Abstract

Populism has been subject to different interpretations in Turkey as a part of political struggles combined with ideological clashes. This study aims to compare two particular versions of populism as articulated by Kemalism and political Islam with different purposes but curiously similar consequences. Locating itself in direct contrast with the ancient regime, Kemalism declared the nation as the source of sovereignty, thus political legitimacy. However, this radical change did not automatically mean active participation of the masses in political life. While ‘the people as nation’ described the culturally and historically defined new overarching identity for all, ‘people as the masses’ distinguished the masses from the educated state elites who would guide them on the road to modernization. De jure, people of Turkey had now become the subject of history, but in order to practice a fully-fledged democracy, they had to wait until they became mature enough for self-government. As ‘the true representatives of the general will’, state elites carried out a radical top-down modernization and they made use of populist discourse to legitimize their political actions. In this process, in conjunction with republicanism and nationalism, populism described the people as ‘a harmonious mass composed of different occupations rather than social classes’. The people referred to an indivisible unity that was free from conflict. Since pluralism became the enemy of common good, a single-party rule was not surprising. The AKP (Justice and Development Party) with political Islamist roots came to power in 2002. Having consolidated its political power through EU-oriented reforms and successive electoral victories, it has gradually accentuated its anti-establishment stance with growing dosage of populism. Secular nationalism has been replaced by a religious nationalism. Presenting itself as ‘the voice of voiceless masses’ that have been pushed to the periphery and forced to adopt ‘imported’ values , the AKP appeals to the masses through a cultural populism by underlining the party’s and its strong leader’s fidelity to national, religious values. Furthermore, despite its harsh neo-liberal economic policies, the party successfully consolidates its mass-friendly image through well-targeted social benefits. At the same time, the AKP’s cultural populism feeds on an illiberal populism that remarkably contributes to increasing authoritarianism in the country. Through an increasingly polarizing us and them distinction and equating democracy with electoral victories, the AKP’s majoritarian understanding of democracy expects people not to be active participants of decision-making processes, but just to legitimize the actions of the strong leader while oppositional forces are demonized. Briefly, focusing on their ideological sources and the discursive indicators, a comparison of Kemalist populism in the single-party period in the 1930s and the AKP’s populism since the early 2000s as two different versions of populism from a particular context may contribute to our general understanding of the slippery concept of populism. These cases also seem to be valuable since they both together compel us to question the controversial relationship between populism and political democracy.