Literature about the evolution and conceptualization of Euroscepticism has proliferated since the 90s. Starting from the dichotomy “hard vs. soft”, various typologies have been created to understand the meaning of this concept typically confined to the periphery or to the extremes of the political spectrum. Despite the huge progresses done by scholars it is undeniable that talking about Euroscepticism is still unsatisfactory, for two main reasons. First, in terms of its substantive meaning. If it is “easy” to understand what “hard” Euroscepticism entails, the boundaries of its softer counterpart are still fuzzy. Is an actor (e.g.: a political party) opposing specific policies enacted by the EU for a specific period of time to be considered as Eurosceptic? Second, can we still think about Euroscepticism as a phenomenon at the margin of the political spectrum? Recent developments of the European political scenario seem to answer to this question with a strong “No!”. At least after the last EP election that saw the boom in consensus for parties extremely opposed to the EU. As a consequence, will we still be able to use the concept of Euroscepticism?
This paper proposes a theoretical reflection on the possibility to abandon it in favour of the one of opposition.
After briefly presenting its evolution in the academic literature, this paper applies conceptualizes opposition within the EU political environment, with two main aims. Firstly it unpacks its meaning through a description of its dimensions. Secondly, it reflects upon its character: are we facing a pragmatic or a principled opposition? Is it negative by default or may we find an opposition, which is more “Europhile” than mainstream parties are?
This paper opens the floor for future research about the concept of opposition as applied to the European panorama, its conceptualization and operationalization.
