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Contesting Popular Sovereignty. Three Ideal Conceptions of the People's Role in Modern Democracy

Democracy
Political Theory
Populism
Jan Pieter Beetz
Utrecht University
Jan Pieter Beetz
Utrecht University

Abstract

Populists claim to represent the people. Political liberals also justify liberal democracy with reference to the people. Yet, even though both groups appeal to ‘the people’, they intensely disagree about the role of the masses in modern democracies. My claims are that the past conceptions of popular sovereignty can illuminate the ideational source of this contemporary conflict, and it uncovers a democratic conception of the people. My conceptual history aims to excavate paradigmatic conceptions of the popular sovereignty. This compound concept connects people (popular) to (political) sovereignty. It structures influential philosophical justifications of democratic politics. My focus lies on canonical treaties from the 19th century, as these rely on the most influential conceptions. I distinguish between three paradigmatic conceptions based on their distinct conception of the people. Firstly, in mainly elitist justifications, the ‘people are beneficiaries’. According to this conception, the masses are right-bearing individuals. The centralized administrative-legal state order should serve these individuals’ shared interests. The people’s (fictitious) will acts as a normative yardstick for good policy. The masses’ actual political role is, however, limited and justified on instrumental grounds. Secondly, the people as a demos underlies electoral, discursive and republican strands of democratic thought. The people constitute a pluralistic whole with broadly defined interests and rights, however no meaningful agreement exists between groups. The masses should participate in multiple democratic procedures in order to effectively create shared understandings of the common good to guide the sovereign state. Thirdly, the people as a nation explicitly grounds modern nationalist justifications of state authority. A shared culture – whether ethnic or civic – constitutes a (political) community with a distinct way of life. This community’s right to self-determination justifies the sovereign rule of the state. The common identity of rulers and the masses should ensure congruence of their political will and thus support for political decisions. The exact role of the masses is contested, but their primary concern should be the protection of their way of life. The three distinct conceptions of popular sovereignty share a commitment to the centralized organization of political authority, however they conceptualize the people in markedly different ways resulting in distinct political roles for the masses. These past meanings of popular sovereignty continue to resonate in this disagreement between political liberals and populists. The former rely upon a conception of the people as primarily beneficiaries and a lesser extent a demos. In effect, they assign a limited political role to the masses based on instrumental considerations. By contrast, and arguably in a more republican vein, populist politicians appeal to a nationalist conception to politically active the masses for their cause. In line with Reinhart Koselleck’s insights, past conceptions continue to resonate in this contemporary disagreement. Interestingly, neither party fully embraces a procedural conception of the people as a demos. Therefore, the masses active participation in politics remains either instrumentally justified or prompted by populists rather than being an inherent part of being a people.