Scholars have recently begun to explore in a more extensive (quantitative and cross-national) manner states’ preferences – or to put it more accurately, their corresponding observable negotiation positions – within the global climate regime anchored in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The value added of those studies is that they analyze a variation in the preferences of a large number of states and supplement description with explanation. However, none of the existing studies have examined in a systematic way the differences that exist among states with regard to the so-called ‘top-down’ elements of the regime, i.e. the elements limiting an increasing autonomy of states within the regime. For this reason, this paper seeks to describe and explain the variation in states’ positions on the top-down elements of the currently negotiated post-2020 architecture of the regime. It elaborates on those elements with the use of the well-established concept of the legalization of international institutions. Proceeding from this concept, it analyzes to what extent the individual states support a) the legally binding nature of the regime, b) the regime’s precise character, and c) the delegation of authority to regime bodies. The paper thus addresses the puzzle of why some of the states participating in the regime support its stronger legalization, while others remain more reluctant. With regard to data, the paper relies on an original content analysis of all the states’ submissions made under the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform in the years 2013-2015. Apart from identifying the existing variation in the positions, the paper also offers its preliminary explanation.
