Multilevel Lobbying: The Impact of Policymaking Vetoes on Venue Selection

Drawing on and integrating the venue shopping and veto player literatures, this paper analyzes the multilevel lobbying strategies of interest groups in the European Union and the United States. I examine the question of whether policymaking vetoes at one governmental level lead interest groups to intensify their lobbying efforts in other policymaking venues. In the EU case, I ask: do veto points at the national level, in the form of minority or coalition governments (instead of single party majorities), lead national interest groups to instead intensify their lobbying activities in Brussels? Data on lobbying activity will come from the EU’s Transparency Register. In the US case, I ask: do veto points (from divided governments) at the subnational level lead state interest groups to intensify their lobbying activities in Washington? Lobbying data will come from the Lobbying Disclosure Act Database. I hypothesize that there is a positive correlation between the strength of the policymaking veto at the lower governmental level and lobbying intensity at the higher governmental level.