What’s the Heavenly Chorus in Italy? Italian Interest Groups’ Access Over the Last Twenty Years (1996-2015)

Within interest group research, scholars following the interest population perspective mainly look at the demographic features of populations and systems under scrutiny: density, diversity, and level of bias represent the main dimensions investigated. Since the 1990s, the interest population perspective has gained higher analytical relevance both in US and EU literature with numerous empirical studies having been published. Notwithstanding, there has been neither systematic analysis of, nor empirical research into, the Italian interest system so far. This paper aims to address exactly this lacuna: following a diachronic perspective – which is generally highly recommended when studying the demography of interests – I count how many politically active interest associations have populated the Italian system over the last twenty years: from 1996 to 2015. Yet, this paper also takes a step further, combining the above-mentioned population perspective with the analysis of interest groups’ access to different political arenas: parliament and media (i.e. newspapers). Indeed, a key issue for interest groups is how much they are able to voice their interests to policymakers and, in turn, to influence public policy. With respect to this, this paper aims at answering two fundamental questions: firstly, is interest groups’ access cumulative (i.e. the same interest groups enjoy more access both with regard to parliament as well as with respect to media) or, on the contrary, are Italian interest groups clearly differentiated on an insider/outsider divide? Secondly, can we ascertain any long-term pattern for Italian interest groups’ access? Theoretically, this paper follows a ‘classic’ resource exchange perspective: expertise is generally considered as being fundamental in order to enjoy parliamentary access, whereas the same can be argued for newsworthiness with regard to media access. Yet, there are also resources which count for both parliamentarians and reporters: above all, reputation makes a difference and, in turn, could lead to cumulative effects across venues. As for the empirical findings, they may be summarized as follows: firstly, from 1996-1998 to 2013-2015, the number of interest groups which were politically active passed from 841 to 1123; thus, the density of the system increased. Secondly, the expansion of the Italian interest system has not been particularly uneven across various categories of interest groups: therefore, both the diversity and the level of bias characterizing the Italian case is impressively stable over time. With regard to access patterns, results are instead contradictory: on a side, labor unions enjoy much more access to media outlets than to parliamentarians, whereas the opposite holds true for groups of institutions and authorities; on the other side, there are interest associations which are over-represented (above all, public interest groups) as well as under-represented (other sectional groups) on both the parliamentary arena and the media arena. Thus, there is no evidence of neither a cumulative effect, nor a clear insider/outsider divide. From a diachronic perspective, the Italian ‘heavenly chorus’ shows a great stability and a clear upper-class accent: business groups was the most over-represented category both in 1996-1998 and in 2013-2015; on the contrary, especially labor unions have lost ground.