The Court of Justice of the EU has been given a potentially far-reaching jurisdiction over the main elements of the Fiscal Compact agreed between the Eurozone Member States in 2012. The Fiscal Compact prohibits budget deficits and provide for a strict system of fiscal discipline in Eurozone Member States, with the Court Of Justice being given a quite general jurisdiction. The meta-teleological method of the Court is well-known, and it remains to be seen if the Court will extend to the caselaw under the Fiscal Compact this interpretative method. This paper seeks to analyse how the might approach its function in light of (i) its more recent caselaw relating to economic governance in the EU, including the judgments in the Pringle and Gauweiler and (ii) how the jurisdiction of the CJ might be exercised compared to the exercise of jurisdiction at national levels in economic matters, which at least in some jurisdictions could tend to suggest a more cautious, less policy-oriented role. Amongst the issues the paper focuses on are the articulation of questions of institutional suitability, deference (or contrary wise, scrutiny of) executive decision-making, and the question of overlap with the TEU and TFEU (which are applicable to all Member States).
