Decision-making in the European Parliament predominantly takes place at committee level, where party groups delegate authority to party group coordinators, who in turn delegate important legislative responsibilities to rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs. Coordinators face a limited talent pool and can strategically select agents in order to minimise agency loss vis-à-vis themselves or the party group. While there is an extensive literature about rapporteurship allocation, the intervening variable of the coordinator has so far been neglected. Drawing on comprehensive data on coordinators and (shadow) rapporteur allocation in the 2004-2014 legislative terms, we investigate two questions. First, to what extent do coordinators prioritise their own preferences over those of the party group when selecting an agent? Second, what are the scope conditions of these selection logics? The findings provide evidence for when “safe” rapporteurs are chosen that will toe the party group line. This has important implications for intra-parliamentary and intra-party delegation, party group cohesion and broader policy-making in the European Union.
