The presence of Eurosceptic parties in the European Parliament has become familiar to the European political landscape. Mainstream European parties seem capable of isolating their rhetoric and stop them from interfering in the daily European political affairs. However, in the context of the multiple crises affecting the solidity of the EU in recent months, the relevance and intensity of Eurosceptic discourse is expected to increase, putting additional pressure on the EU. We should therefore focus more on understanding how such parties manage to gain access to the European Parliament and, implicitly, political relevance at the European level.
“European” elections take place at the national level and the rise of Eurosceptic parties is often explained from a country perspective and usually focusing only on the context prior to the European elections. However, the presence of Eurosceptic parties in the EP is no longer an accident or the product of favorable but unusual electoral contexts. Moreover, the wide majority of states “sent” Eurosceptics in the EP at least once in the last three European elections.
This paper aims an answer to the following research question: What are the common features of national politics in EU member states that favor the constant access of Eurosceptic parties in the European Parliament? I conduct a large scale comparative study on the last three European elections in all member states, with each state in each election regarded as a separate case (82 cases in total). I will use Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), as it is capable of accommodating both a larger number of cases and shed light on the particularities of each case. The potential explanations I will be focusing on deal with internal political and economic contexts prior to the elections, the political position of Eurosceptic parties, or the role of electoral turnout.
