The use of parliamentary oversight is motivated by gathering additional information asymmetries in order to influence the policy outcome. Following the literature, either the opposition scrutinizes the government or the parliament is used by coalition partners to keep taps on the minister in charge. Yet, how do we explain resolutions or statements if neither the opposition nor the coalition partner commands a parliamentary majority?
Applying coalition theory, we study the co-authorship of parliamentary resolutions on EU law proposals in Finland and Germany.
With a view to domestic politics we expect that in the Eduskunta the homogeneity of policy-specific party positions is decisive. By contrast, the high level of coalition discipline renders policy preferences irrelevant in Germany.
With a view to EU-level explanations, we expect two types of coalitions. Type 1 is initiated by the governing parties and strengthens the bargaining position of “their” lead minister. Type 2 is initiated by the opposition and weakens the bargaining position of the lead minister. Given the differences in coalition discipline, we expect type 1 coalitions to be more likely in Germany than in Finland.
