Enlargement policy has been one of the most powerful foreign policy tools of the European Union (EU) in transforming European countries’ political system. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), on the contrary, has been described which are not capable of achieving breakthrough results neither in the Southern nor in the Eastern neighbourhood. The literature has clearly shown the weaknesses of the ENP (e.g. the lack of the future membership or the relatively small financial incentives), however, the role of external actors has so far attracted limited scholarly attention.
In Eastern Europe, for instance, Russia plays a significant role in shaping other countries’ political life. Ten years ago, Moscow downplayed the EU’s willingness and ability to transform the status quo in Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, by declaring a stronger desire to attract Ukraine to the EU (e.g. with Association Agreements), Russia's initial serenity came to an end. The annexation of the Crimean peninsula and the destabilization of certain parts of Eastern Ukraine are clear signs that Russia does not want to see Ukraine adopting further European standards, norms or values.
These shortcomings have clear impact on the democratisation process of Ukraine. Through a case study, it will be shown that the Eastern Partnership’s own efforts are not only limited by its own weaknesses in Ukraine but also by the foreign policy and vision of Russia. My main purpose is to describe the process of how a weakened Ukrainian central government by Russia affects the prospects of the neighbourhood to take the necessary democratic reforms. The role of Russia cannot be neglected in other Eastern European countries either. Therefore, the results may add some new elements to the ENP literature in determining the factors which foster the democratisation process in the neighbourhood.
