Although the system of interest representation at the European level is often described as pluralist, given the many actors involved and multiple access points, one has also talked about ‘Euro-corporatism; and this, for mainly two reasons: firstly, the system of European social dialogue, inspired by national industrial relations systems traditionally described as neo-corporatist; and secondly, a system of interest representation based on advisory structures, often not very transparent but where selected groups deliberate and often formulate consensus solutions; this in contrast to the American neo-pluralist solution where participation is transparent but more antagonist and procedurelised through court.
In this paper I investigate whether and how the EU’s turn to ‘Better Regulation’ has affected this Euro-corporatist dimension. The Better Regulation agenda refers to arguments on better evidence-based policy-making, participatory governance, and more efficient and ‘thinner’ EU intervention. The paper will show that the Better Regulation tends to weaken the two dimensions of Euro-corporatism.
