The euro crisis provided a trigger for substantial institutional change within the governance framework of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and, more specifically, the domain of economic policy-making. Immediate crisis management measures and the agreed institutional reforms have implied far-reaching and unprecedented interventions by the European Union (EU) into domestic decision-making. There is little doubt that the euro crisis represents the background to a further deepening of European integration. Yet, integration did not occur following traditional lines and did not lead to a significant empowerment of old community institutions – notably the Commission and the Court of Justice. Though its role of a watchdog in the field of economic policy has been further strengthened, the Commission was not granted autonomous decision-making powers which would allow the unilateral sanctioning of member states’ economic policies. Instead the Commission relies heavily on political endorsement by the Eurogroup and the European Council when it comes to the eventual enforcement of EMU’s set of fiscal rules. The community budget plays no role in the financing of the EU’s novel stability instruments, which allow de facto bail-outs of member states in financial difficulties. At the same time the EU has not remained complacent and has developed a more interventionist economic governance framework and collective mechanisms for future crisis management. Institutional change in the context of the euro crisis challenges existing integration theories. Deliberative intergovernmentalism offers an alternative explanation of institutional change. This perspective does not interpret the abandoning of the model of classical community method integration as an abandoning of the integration process. Member states are reacting to growing policy interdependencies through an intensification of intergovernmental policy coordination. The European Council and the Eurogroup become the key actors within the Union.
