This paper analyzes the evolution of EU governance since the financial and sovereign debt crisis from an experimentalist perspective. It argues that EU governance in many key policy domains continues to take the form of an experimentalist decision-making architecture, based on a recursive process of framework goal-setting and revision through comparative review of implementation experience in diverse local contexts, which is well adapted to the Union’s turbulent and polyarchic environment. The first part of the paper presents a synoptic theoretical account of the characteristics of experimentalist governance, and summarizes the empirical evidence on its incidence and operation within the EU before the crisis. The second part of the paper examines two ‘hard cases’ from an experimentalist perspective, namely, financial regulation and the European Semester of socio-economic policy coordination. The paper concludes that both cases illustrate the limits of hierarchical forms of governance under the diverse and polyarchic conditions of the EU, together with the continuing attraction of experimentalist approaches for tackling complex, uncertain problems like financial regulation and reform of national employment and social protection systems.
